Business cycle research has fallen into one of two camps: the Keynesian tradition, where demand disturbances give rise to aggregate fluctuations as a result of money illusion; and the new classical school, where informational misperceptions in a fully rational framework yield short-run (and sometimes autocorrelated) deviations away from equilibrium income. Both approaches seem to raise difficulties. The Keynesian explanation rests on ad hoc and irrational behaviour, its hallmark being, according to its critics, the failure of agents to execute perceived, mutually advantageous trades. While the classical models escape this criticism, they are still at a preliminary and inconclusive stage in explaining the cycle. Thus, an explanation of why demand disturbances generate aggregate fluctuations remains high on the macroeconomic agenda.
I. NEAR RATIONALITY IN A STATIC MODEL
In a fully classical economy, changes in the level of demand do not alter the level of output. Rather, prices change to accommodate the demand shift, while quantities, determined in the labour market, remain unchanged. This section shows how, in a competitive framework, such a conclusion need not be robust against small deviations from rationality. Rather, if some fraction of firms pursue a policy such as expanding hiring and production when demand rises -a strategy which we will demonstrate to be near rational, in Akerlof and Yellen's (i 985 a) sense -demand disturbances can indeed give rise to aggregate fluctuations. ' In microeconomic contexts, the effects of small departures from rationality have been studied in the recent game theory-industrial organisation literature (see, e.g. Radner, I980). Akerlof and Yellen (I985b) give a wide range of other microeconomic examples where privately almost costless actions lead to large social costs or benefits. In related work, Haltiwanger and Waldman (i 985) address some microeconomic examples where, with both 'sophisticated' and 'naive' agents in the population, the interest is on whether one group or the other (or neither) exerts a 'disproportionate' influence in the equilibrium. Their focus is, however, different from these other papers, and also from that to be presented below, in that they do not restrict their naive agents to be nearly sophisticated, or near rational.
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We examine an economy with two types of firms: those that maximise fully, given the set of prices they face, and those that adjust their level of production in the short run to changes in demand. The markets for labour and output operate competitively, labour supply depending on the real wage and demand for output depending on its price. Each maximising firm takes the real wage as given and hires by a marginal product rule. Each near rational firm, however, alters its hiring level with the perceived level of demand, while still paying the going real wage.
We note at the outset that this rule of thumb differs from the inertial behaviour (with regard to quantities or prices) found in some of the earlier work we cited above. Ourjustification for such a rule is the simple one that this policy, adjusting employment to take all the labour supplied at the going wage, is both plausible and easy to implement. On a deeper level, it could thus qualify as salient according to Simon's notion of procedural rationality in a satisficing context. Recently, Nelson and Winter (I982) have suggested that firms typically adhere to fixed, simple procedural rules in the short run, even in the face of external disturbances, with evolutionary forces then determining the pattern of observed behaviour. In this light, a critical aspect of the rule of thumb we consider is that, in addition to being easy to follow, it is also almost costless.
The intuition behind our results can be seen by considering an upward shift in the level of demand. The near rational firms increase hiring to accommodate the increased demand, thereby raising the real wage, and, as a result, the level of employment at the maximising firms falls. This partially offsets the increased labour demand, so that the new equilibrium has greater employment, higher output and a shift in the allocation of production towards the near rational firms. Moreover, this new equilibrium is consistent with the price of output remaining unchanged, though the real wage is of course increased.
The properties displayed by the economy heuristically described above depend essentially on two factors: (i) the extent to which aggregate employment adjusts in the face of a demand shift; and (ii) the degree of misallocation of labour, relative to a first best where marginal products are equated in all uses, that is induced by the different responses of the two types of firms. The first effect would naturally lead to countercyclical productivity, other things being equal, given the concavity of firms' technologies. For the model to display broad consistency with.Okun's Law, then, the second effect has to predominate.
The Basic Model
Let the maximising firms be denoted by the subscript m, and let the nonmaximisers be denoted by the subscript n. For expository convenience, we will assume there is only one firm of each type in the economy. Both firms are price takers in the same product market: this market clears in both the short and the long run. They each hire labour, Lm and Ln respectively, and produce output according to the production functions Fm (. ) and Fn (. Labour supply is given by LS = qS(w/P),
and the maximising firm hires according to Fm (Lm) = w/P.
In the long run, the near-rational firm also hires according to a marginal product rule and this, together with market clearance L = Ls = Lm+Lnw (4) completes the description of long-run equilibrium. In the short run, however, the non-maximising firm adjusts hiring in response to changes in the level of demand, taking up whatever slack is left given the disturbance to Yand the equilibrium response of the maximiser. Thus, we retain market clearing, even in the short run, with aggregate employment variation reflecting the labour supply elasticity given the shift in the real wage. Moreover, it is readily seen that this strategy of responding to demand shifts is a near rational one. Intuitively, the reason for this is clear. Given the specified rule of thumb, the firm hires labour at the wrong level, relative to marginal productivity considerations at the wage it is paying. Were it to optimise, it believes the wage it would pay would remain the same, but it would now select an employment level to equate the wage and labour's marginal product. The change in revenue consequent upon adherence to the simple rule of thumb is almost exactly offset by the change in costs, and hence the loss of profits is second-order small. The two terms in this derivative reflect the two effects mentioned at the outset. The leading term comes from the output change consequent upon the change in total employment; the second term reflects the fact that, as (I 2) and (I 3) record, there is a different response by each of the two firms, leading to an inefficient short run allocation of labour. Clearly, as y approaches zero, the derivative becomes k-1 = Y*/(w*/P)L*, the ratio of the average to the marginal product of labour. The Okun's Law ratio is less than one, and a classical type of result obtains. For larger values of y, the effect of inefficient labour allocation can increase this ratio, at least for sizable negative demand shocks when labour can be reallocated very inefficiently and the goods market still clears. Note, however, that this Okun's Law effect is of second order in this static model. Second, there is a possibility that large, positive demand shocks cannot be accommodated by the near rational firm, depending on the labour supply 19871 DEMAND DISTURBANCES 55 elasticity. Fig. I shows the labour market equilibrium in the long and short run.' The long-run aggregate labour supply and demand are given by q! and L4R, respectively. The slopes of the short run labour demand curves depend on whether the demand shift is positive or negative. For a positive shift, the maximising firm will contract production, responding to the higher wage it faces as the near rational firm increases hiring, and conversely for a negative shift. Thus the short run demand curve slopes down when the maximiser expands hiring and up when it contracts, and the locus of points with minimum total employment -when marginal products are equated at the two firms -is the long-run demand curve. Evidently, marginal products and labour supply might be such that an increase in product demand would shift the labour demand curve sufficiently far out that the labour market would not clear. This would necessarily occur with perfectly inelastic labour supply: in this case, no positive real demand shock could be met. In general, whether labour supply can expand enough to meet short run demand will be determined by the relevant slopes.
Third, we note from (i o) that the model predicts a real wage that is first order pro-cyclical. This prediction is consistent with recent empirical evidence, based on disaggregated data or on data from a number of industrial nations, where strong pro-cyclicality has been found (Schor, I985; Bils, I985). We return to this point in connection with the properties of our dynamic model in Section II.
In summary, this simple static model illustrates how adherence to a near rational rule of thumb can alter the properties of an otherwise classical model. Aggregate fluctuations can arise from demand disturbances as a result of the interaction of the two types of firm. A negative demand shock induces the non-maximising firm to reduce employment and output. Total labour supply drops with the real wage, and there are temporary labour flows from the non-maximising to the maximising firm. The response to a positive demand shock is symmetric, with the maximising firm reducing employment and the non-maximising firm expanding, except that total employment will change relatively more than for a negative shock. For reasonable parameter values, a moderate decline in demand can result in a decline in output which exceeds the decline in employment. Clearly, for both positive and negative shocks, an activist policy ofdemand management might serve to stabilise both employment and output.
Finally, note that this simple static model can be extended to account for alternative labour market arrangements, adding greater realism at the cost of some complexity. In an Appendix, we present the general model that allows for differential wages at the two types of firms, and we give two important applications of this general structure. We first detail a model where the near rational firm faces contractual limitations that produce downward nominal wage rigidity; this clearly reduces the magnitude of fluctuations in average compensation. We then study a model where the efficiency wages are paid in the non-maximising sector. This creates a gap between the marginal products in the two firms and, as a result, the short term transfer of labour from one firm 56 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [MARCH to another will now have a first-order effect. The Okun's Law ratio will then be higher, under plausible parameterisations, than in the basic competitive model, and there will be deviations in the maximising firm's wage that exceed the changes in average compensation.
II. THE DYNAMIC FRAMEWORK
In this section we develop a dynamic macroeconomic model with near rationality and we study its implications for the joint properties of wages, employment and output. We define behaviour as stochastically near rational if it results in losses, relative to what could individually be achieved by full maximisation, that have an expected value which is second order in the standard deviation of the exogenous shock. Restricting the non-maximising firms to stochastically near-rational policies amounts to disallowance of more than second-order mistakes, on the average, and seems the natural extension of the concept of static near rationality. There are many sets of operating rules that could qualify as stochastically near rational in the model we employ. One salient policy, which is the one we investigate, is for the non-maximising firm to pay a constant real wage while hiring labour so as to accommodate short-run demand disturbances. Such a strategy has the merit of simplicity -non-maximising firms respond to changes in their perceived demand, holding wages constant -and will be not far from optimal on average, the gains for some realisations balancing the losses for others. However, we will show how such a sensible, if suboptimal, policy can lead to our simple model economy exhibiting a surprising accordance with key macroeconomic empirical regularities.
The model we consider has two types of firms, as did our earlier static framework. Here, however, long-run equilibrium wages are assumed to be higher in the non-maximising firm. This assumption is based on the observation that wages commonly differ across jobs requiring broadly similar skills. Several theoretical explanations of such differentials exist, even when labour is homogeneous, as in our model. The efficiency wage model, in its various forms, provides one explanation since labour productivity depends upon the real wage.1 Or some jobs may be unionised and others not, with the union workers being both more productive and better paid.2 While we will not restrict ourselves to any one particular motivation for this long-run differential, it is consistent with the notion of a 'dual labour market' and with the idea that recessions are best characterised, not as an absolute shortage ofjobs, but as a shortage of good jobs. 
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Our dynamic model remains close to the basic static framework for expository purposes. We introduce the possibility of serial correlation of the demand disturbances, but all other features of a dynamic model are deliberately suppressed. Production is instantaneous, there is no net investment in inventories or capital, and workers supply labour according to qS(.) without intertemporal substitution considerations. Augmentation of the dynamic structure along these or other lines would add to the analysis, and particularly to the empirical performance of the model, but at the cost of clarity.
The Model
We will detail the model in terms of deviations around the long-run equilibrium, analogously to our solution of the static model. It will suffice for our results to retain only leading terms in the expansions, so we will omit all higher order terms from the outset.
Goods market equilibrium at time t is given by The solution to this linear model in terms of the demand disturbances is straightforward. We first present this solution and then check that the assumed rule of thumb is, according to the concept of stochastic near rationality, a sensible policy. That done, we return to examine the properties of our solution, particularly the implied variances and covariances of output, employment and wages during a sequence of stochastic short-run equilibria. 
Finally, the behaviour of average compensation is given by
It is readily established that the proposed rule of thumb is in fact stochastically near rational, either if the non-maximising firm pays a constant real wage or, more generally, if 0nt = 0mt* In the former case, our previous results apply directly. In the latter, we let tildes denote variables evaluated under the rule of thumb and overbars denote evaluation if the firm were to maximise, so that nnt represents profits at t under the rule of thumb and iint represents profits that the non-maximising firm would realise were it to hire optimally. Then, expanding F(Lnt) around Lnt and retaining terms to second order, use of (22) and some rearrangement yields We now turn to examine the properties of the solution to this model. We are interested in the behaviour of output, employment and wages implied by our solution. In principle, one can calculate variances and covariances of these magnitudes directly from our solution (22)-(26).
However, these moments depend non-linearly on the underlying parameters of technology and labour supply and are difficult to interpret directly. Consequently, we have computed the moments of these variables numerically using specific parameter values. For these calculations, we assume that the non-maximising firm has a production function Fn(Ln) = LO', that a = 0o5, that k = o-67, and that one half of the labour force is employed in the non-maximising firm, so that sn = 0 5. We compute the moment ratios for three plausible values for the elasticity of labour supply, OI5, @O2o and 0-25, and we allow for a range of values for w*/w*, the ratio of long run wages at the two firms. The results are presented in Table I . The second column of Table i presents the ratio of the standard deviation I9871 DEMAND DISTURBANCES 59 of output fluctuations to the standard deviation of employment changes: this is the Okun's Law ratio for this economy. For the parameter values specified, the ratio ranges from I22 to 387. It is smaller as the elasticity of labour supply is larger and as the long-run equilibrium wage gap between the two firms is smaller. This has an intuitive interpretation. In this model, output can be reduced in two ways: by workers deciding not to work at the wage offered, or by workers shifting from the non-maximising to the maximising firm and thereby becoming less productive. Thus, employment will be less sensitive to demand and output disturbances when it is less responsive to changes in the wage and when the gap in worker productivities between the two firms is larger.
The true coefficients of hypothetical regressions of average and marginal wages on output are presented in the final two columns of Table i One open question that arises from these numerical results is the extent to which Okun's Law is an inter-sectoral phenomenon. Although evidence has been cited of procyclical productivity in most sectors (e.g. Bernanke and Powell, I986; Fay and Medoff, i985), several recent papers highlight the role of inter-sectoral shifts over the cycle (e.g. Lilien, I982; Abraham and Katz, I986). These two effects can be complementary, of course, but we are at present unaware of any precise attempts to assess their relative importance. Such empirical study will ultimately determine the quantitative importance of this near rational model of Okun's Law and the cycle.
Finally, we note that, since output is determined by aggregate demand in the short run, there may be a role for demand management by the government in this type of economy. Indeed, if the shock Et were observable to the government and if entirely effective demand management instruments were available, then these instruments could be used to stabilise output and employment completely. If, as is more likely, the shocks to demand were only partially observable or the demand management instruments could only be used with a lag or were 1 A referee has pointed out to us that, under the efficiency wage interpretation, changes in the maximiser's wage may alter the cost ofjob loss, the sorting effect of differential wages, or worker morale at the near rational firm. Consequently, even with payment of a constant efficiency wage in the short run, there may be an indirect effect on productivity through this changed relative wage. The general effect of this will be to lower the Okun's Law ratio for any particular set of parameters relative to the figures in Table i Whether such policies would be welfare enhancing is beyond the scope of formal treatment in this paper, although we conjecture that, while any gains would be of second order in our static model (essentially because that model has no externalities), the benefits of policy could be first order in the dynamic setting with long-run intersectoral wage differentials. The welfare properties of these efficiency wage type models are an important topic for further study.
III. CONCLUSION
This paper has shown how, contrary to some views, many Harberger triangles can indeed make an Okun gap. It has illustrated how adherence to a near-rational rule of thumb can dramatically alter the properties of short-run macroeconomic equilibria, with otherwise classical models exhibiting aggregate fluctuations in response to demand disturbances. Most significantly, the framework we analysed naturally gave rise to patterns of co-variation among wages in the flexible wage sector, average compensation, employment and output which squared up well with the empirical facts. This suggests that near-rational theories of the cycle merit further quantitative investigation.
